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“A fraud, a drunkard, and a worthless scamp”: estate agents, regulation, and Realtors 
in the interwar period 
 
Abstract: The estate agency industry played a key role in the growth of the interwar property 
market. An important feature of the industry was the low barriers to entry, particularly in 
terms of regulating practitioners. Yet repeated attempts were made to introduce mandatory 
licensing of estate agents during this period, all of which failed. This article explores why 
these attempts were instigated, by whom, and why they failed. It utilises the comparison with 
the successful introduction of licensing for real estate brokers in USA. The article argues that 
the desire for a professional identity fuelled these regulatory efforts, and that industry specific 
endogenous tensions led to their failure. In doing so, this article informs our knowledge both 
of the interwar development of this key service industry, and of the concepts used to analyse 
regulation more generally. 
 
Keywords: regulation; licensing; professionalisation; estate agents; property market; Realtors; 
interwar.  
 
 
It was only the other day that a police officer at the London Sessions said that a 
man was a fraud, a drunkard, and a worthless scamp. That man got four years for 
false pretences and conspiracy. Yet directly he emerges from prison he can start 
again in business.
1
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On 9 April 1935, Lord Eltisley made a speech to the House of Lords urging them to examine 
the question of state licensing for auctioneers and house agents - the occupation more 
commonly known as estate agency. Drawing on evocative examples of the types of ‘rogues’ 
in the industry he argued that currently ‘no kind of protection is given by the State . . . either 
to the public’ or to those agents who were ‘legitimately and properly carrying on a very 
important business.’ Eltisley claimed that immediate action was required as ‘vast numbers of 
complaints have been received, and are being daily received’ regarding the conduct of estate 
agents
2
 Eltisley’s 1935 request was the last of several interwar attempts at securing 
legislation to regulate the industry via mandatory licensing. Yet, despite these intense and 
sustained efforts, all failed. To this day estate agency remains unlicensed. 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore why these attempts to licence estate agents were 
instigated, by whom, and why they failed. It will do so in order to provide the first 
substantive insights into the largely unexplored topic of the interwar development of estate 
agency. This was the formative period of an industry which was, according to Merritt, 
‘centrally involved’ in the expansion of homeownership in the UK and ‘the growth of modern 
capitalism’.3 Similarly, Marriott argues that estate agency, as the industry which ‘all circles of 
the property business revolve around’, played an instrumental role in the UK’s twentieth 
century commercial property boom.
4
 Yet despite these claims estate agency has received only 
cursory attention from the literature on the development of the interwar property market – a 
seminal period in Britain’s long run transition to owner-occupied housing, and the expansion 
of the commercial property sector.
5
 Marriott’s work illustrates that estate agency’s low 
barriers to entry, and the lack of regulation (in particular, the ability of individuals to perform 
both the role of estate agent and secondary occupations such as property developer) was 
crucial to the emergence of a competitive, entrepreneurial, dynamic, and at times ethically 
3 
 
dubious, property conveyancing industry that both reflected and fuelled a similarly dynamic 
property market.
6
 
 
Therefore, understanding why the regulation of estate agency was promoted and failed during 
the interwar period is an important first step in understanding the development of this pivotal 
yet under-researched service industry. Furthermore, by exploring this issue, and expanding 
the small body of literature which analyses unsuccessful regulatory attempts, we can broaden 
our understanding of the factors which drove and shaped the regulatory environment during 
the interwar years. The article will incorporate an explicitly comparative element, and draw 
on the experience of real estate brokerage in the US. During the same period the latter 
industry - similar in many ways to its British counterpart, and profoundly influential in the 
growth of urban America - witnessed the successful implementation via state-by-state 
legislation, of a system of mandatory licensing for real estate brokers.
7
   
 
The article is organised as follows. Section I will place estate agency in its historical and 
historiographical context. It will also illustrate how the two theories of “public interest” and 
“regulatory capture” have been used to explore the emergence and development of regulation 
such as occupational licensing. Section II looks briefly, via the historiography, at the case of 
real estate brokerage in the USA. It will illustrate that licensing was the core component of a 
professionalization project, to raise the status of real estate brokers. It will demonstrate how 
regulatory attempts met with deep resistance from within the industry, and how these tensions 
were successfully overcome. Section III looks at the pre-WWI organisation of estate agency 
and initial the attempts at regulation. It will argue that, as with real estate brokerage, there 
was a desire amongst practitioners to raise the status of their emergent occupation via 
professionalization. Many within the industry, specifically its trade association, saw 
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regulatory capture, and their control over the ability to restricted entry into the occupation via 
licensing, as key to professionalization. Section IV explores the reasons why these attempts 
failed. It will demonstrate how tensions developed within the industry over the desirability of 
regulation as a route to professionalization. The resulting schisms split the industry, fatally 
undermining support for regulatory attempts. Sections III and IV will draw primarily on the 
surviving records of the Auctioneers’ and Estate Agents’ Institute, the professional body of 
the period, and the trade paper the Estates Gazette, both rich and previously untapped 
sources. Section IV offers some concluding remarks. It will highlight the contribution this 
case study makes to the broader debate on the role regulatory capture and public interest play 
in instigating regulatory attempts, and in determining their outcomes. 
 
 
Regulatory capture vs Public interest: theories of regulation 
 
The interwar period witnessed remarkable growth in homeownership, and expansion of the 
commercial property market in the UK.8 This was fuelled by the development and growth  of 
key associated industries such as mortgage and credit providers, developers and 
housebuilders, and consumer goods retailers. 9  Estate agents played a key role in the 
expansion of the property market by performing the crucial market function of bringing 
buyers and sellers together, connecting clients with the required legal and financial 
organisations, and by ‘propounding the very ideology of owner-occupation’ and 
suburbanisation.10  For better or worse, estate agents have long been ‘centrally involved’11 in 
the growth of owner-occupation and operated as the ‘fulcrum of the development world’.12 
The numbers of individuals engaged in estate agency expanded significantly over the 1920s 
and 30s with the available evidence indicating that numbers more than doubled.
13
 As a result, 
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the interwar years were a formative period in the emergence of estate agency as an industry – 
indeed, it was during the 1920 and 30s that the term “estate agent” entered widespread 
usage. 14  In short, estate agency grew in terms of sheer numbers of practitioners, their 
visibility, and in terms of their embeddedness in the process of facilitating property 
transactions.
15
 By the mid-1930s, as well as Eltisley’s critique, we also get satirical prints and 
newspaper reports purporting to reflect the “publics” view of estate agency as an industry 
whose uncontrolled expansion needed taming. 
 
Figures 1 & 2. 
 
However, efforts to regulate estate agency had begun in earnest long before the 1930s. The 
first serious attempt at securing regulatory legislation was in 1914, and repeat attempts were 
made during the 1920s. These attempts are far from incongruous. As the interwar British 
economy struggled with the recession of the early 1920s and depression of 1930s, bouts of 
rising unemployment, and declining industrial competitiveness, so a slow erosion of the 
states’ previous laissez-fair attitude to the economy took place, and there was increasing 
public and political support for government intervention to address the nation’s social and 
economic ills.
16
   Many industries, including a number associated with the property market, 
were subject to state backed regulation. These included industries as varied as, mortgage 
provision, hire purchase, materials manufacture, food production, and transport.17 In order to 
explore why such industry regulation emerges, the theories of public interest and regulatory 
capture are most commonly used.18    
  
In the context of regulation such as occupational licensing the public interest theory posits 
that the ‘sellers of specialised services are better informed than buyers about the various 
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dimensions of product quality’. 19  Therefore, as a result of this asymmetric market 
information, and in order to prevent lower quality practitioners driving higher quality 
practitioners out of the market – Akerlof’s “lemons” problem 20  – consumers, pressure 
groups, or service providers can seek state regulation in the form of occupational licensing. A 
license becomes a source of information to the consumer about the type and standard of 
service they can expect, and poor quality practitioners are removed from the market. In this 
way licensing corrects market imperfections caused by information asymmetry, and serves 
the ‘public interest’ by protecting the consumer. Conversely, regulatory capture theory states 
that an industry or profession can use the apparatus of the state either proactively to acquire 
licensing, or reactively to shape licensing to its advantage. The resultant licencing authorities 
– those issuing licences and policing the system – are often populated and controlled by 
members of the industry or profession. The whole apparatus of licensing is therefore 
“captured” by the industry and works primarily for the industry’s benefit, with the objective 
to ‘limit the number of professionals, increase prices, and weaken competition.’ 21  The 
outcome is reduced competition leading to cartels and monopolies, and higher labour costs. 
The regulatory capture theory, promoted by the work of influential scholars such Friedman, 
Kuznets, and Stigler, has long been the favoured theory to explain the emergence of 
occupational licensing.
22
 A further aspect to the issue of occupational licensing is its role in 
the creation of professions. According to Wilensky’s classic five stage model, an occupation 
can seek to obtain licensing to enable it to exclude unqualified practitioners as part of a 
broader process to achieve professional status. The additional stages of this process are that 
the occupation must become a full-time occupation for its practitioners, the training of 
practitioners must become increasingly institutionalised and prescribed, an exclusive 
professional association must be formed, and a “code of ethics” must be drawn up to exclude 
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the unqualified and unscrupulous, to reduce internal competition, and to protect clients and 
emphasise the service ideal.
23
 
 
As Kim and Law note, the history of occupational licensing is a relatively uncharted area of 
research on regulation. However, their work on licensing and the development of professions 
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America, illustrates how the theories outlined 
above can be deployed in the analysis of occupation licensing. They argue that external 
public interest concerns triggered successful attempts at licensing. To protect the public 
interest, state governments reacted to public concern and successfully licensed occupations 
such as medicine and veterinary practice where the issues of information asymmetry were 
‘most troubling’ for the consumer.24 This, in turn led to regulatory capture, and cemented 
their status as professions. This process of ‘public outcry’, disaster or scandal triggering 
moves to regulate industries in the name of public interest, and industries capturing the 
regulatory process to ensure outcomes acceptable to them is common in the literature.
25
 The 
climate in the interwar UK was particularly conducive to this process as the government 
sought private enterprise or ‘arms-length’ solutions to market failures wherever possible,26 
and a key feature of government regulation of industry was its largely consensual nature, 
where ‘state supported schemes’ were often promoted and directed by the private sector 
industries themselves.
27
 Yet occupations where the issue of information asymmetry have less 
profound consequences rarely trigger episodes of widespread public concern over their 
behaviour. This was the case with estate agency. Prior to the mid-1930s there had been no 
“public outcry” to regulate estate agents, no headline grabbing scandals, yet by this point 
several determined attempts at securing licensing had already been made. Furthermore, whilst 
most research explores why regulation is successfully implemented, few studies explicitly 
address the equally important question of why regulatory attempts fail. However, work on the 
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pharmaceutical and retail industries illustrates the prominent role that internal opposition 
from within the industry itself can play in such regulatory failures.
28
 
 
Literature on the development of the real estate industry in the USA draws upon these ideas 
of public interest, regulatory capture, professionalization, and internal tensions, to address the 
question of what drove and shaped licensing of real estate brokers. Therefore, it offers an 
extremely appropriate and valuable comparative case study for this research. 
 
 
Realtors and regulation: the US context 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries real estate brokerage began to emerge as a 
distinct occupation. In the wake of the property market boom and bust of the 1880s and 90s, 
local real estate boards developed. These fraternal membership-only associations were 
formed to promote fellowship amongst “high class” brokers, which they did via endless 
socialising, educational events, and dense networks of political and business relationships; to 
create less ruinously competitive and anarchic real estate markets (of the type which caused 
the 1880s boom) and, to improve the public’s image of the real estate broker (which, never 
good, had been further damaged by 1890s crash).
29
One key objective of these boards 
therefore was to establish stable oligopolistic real estate markets under their benign guidance. 
They standardised rules of conduct for transactions, collected and organised data, and created 
a mechanism for buyers and sellers come together, the Multiple Listing System.
30
 But more 
importantly they sought to fashion their occupations as a competent, trustworthy, 
entrepreneurial, and influential profession. 
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The creation, by the boards of a national professional association, the National Association of 
Real Estate Exchanges – NARAB - followed in 1908. 31  From the start the NAREB 
establishment saw licensing, and the ability to police entry into their occupation as a key 
component of their professionalization project.
32
 Over the next two decades NAREB pursued 
the further elements of professionalization as outlined in Wilensky’s model. They drew upon 
the emerging field of social science, to create an ‘an uncontested field of specialised 
knowledge underpinned by scientific authority’33 christened Realology. A Realology training 
curriculum was developed and approved (by the American Association of Business Colleges 
amongst others) allowing academic institutions to offer a four-year course for the training of 
practitioners.
34
 The NAREB national committee also devised an ethics code which 
‘enumerated a formidable list of proscribed behaviour’.35 Most importantly, in 1916, NAREB 
created a brand name for brokers, the Realtor, which gained legal standing in 1920. This 
professional branding proved extremely popular amongst rank and file members (evidenced 
by the fact that by 1922 fifty-five member boards had changed their names to include it.
36
) 
and local boards were quick to police the use of the term via the courts and informal pressure. 
Finally, in 1918 the NAREB convention ratified a model licensing law. Many states enacted 
this almost verbatim over the course of the 1920s and the licensing process became 
increasingly standardised throughout the 1920s and 30s.
37
 In 1922 the US supreme court 
upheld the constitutionality of the licensing laws, and between 1923 and 1950 the number of 
state with licensing had grown from 13 to 40.
38
 Yet licensing, and the regulatory capture it 
involved, had initially met with fierce opposition from elements within NAREB and the 
industry itself.  
 
From the outset the Realtors professionalization project contained two cohorts which 
Hornstein describes as the technocrats and the entrepreneurs. Tensions existed between the 
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two camps over the issue of Realology, and whether training should be based on “scientific” 
or applied knowledge. A compromise was ultimately found, as, alongside the four-year 
academic course (accompanied by its twelve 350 page textbooks), NAREB also devised a 
sixteen-week course for the ‘busy practical businessman’ – those of a more entrepreneurial 
persuasion – which was accompanied by a condensed series of textbooks.39 Yet the crisis was 
more acute over licensing. The NAREB national committee – predominantly technocrats – 
wanted to re-orientate the profession away from purely entrepreneurial capitalism towards 
more public service values. They saw high barriers to entry as key to achieving this. Initially 
the committee proposed that Realtors would require an affidavit from county judge or 
prominent person to testify to their character, and pass a test by a state Real Estate 
commission to demonstrate competency. The process would be administrated by a state board 
comprised of experienced NAREB men. The technocrats believed state backed licensing – 
effectively the ability of a NAREB elite to determine who became a Realtor – was required to 
put real estate brokerage on a par with professions such as medicine and the law. There was 
significant opposition from local boards and rank and file members – largely in the 
entrepreneur’s camp - to this “establishment” idea of licensing. These free marketeers deeply 
resented the idea of the government effectively becoming gatekeeper to their occupation, and 
the state acting as guarantor of their honesty. They contended that local boards were better 
placed to decide upon the fitness of a colleague to become a Realtor rather than any outside 
body. They saw licensing as an admittance of defeat in the professionalization project, as the 
profession was essentially declaring that it was unable to police itself.
40
 
 
The tensions over licensing threatened to split NAREB. Yet, compromise was reached. The 
model licensing law left the exact composition of the licensing board to the discretion of the 
state authorities and local boards rather than a NAREB elite, fees were nominal, competency 
11 
 
tests were not required, and the character test simply involved providing two affidavits from 
“prominent” persons in the applicants’ hometown. Therefore, in practice, applications to 
become a Realtor were rarely denied.
41
 In addition, the MLS, and in particular the brand 
identity of the Realtor incentivised rank and file members to remain as NAREB controlled 
access to both. Finally, as with other trade associations in the US, the social capital that 
NAREB’s associational activities generated was clearly important. Luncheons, dinners, stag 
parties, golf outings and so forth cemented personal and business relations within branches, 
and the four-day long social events that were NAREB conventions did the same at a national 
level. These activities played a crucial role in crafting a sense of collective identity for 
Realtors, which in turn held these competing economic agents together to achieve their 
broader economic objectives.
42
 However, these tensions clearly shaped the form the 
regulation eventually took. Whilst NAREB achieved regulation, and Realtors realised their 
ambitions of becoming a highly influential profession in shaping interwar urban America, the 
picture was very different for their UK counterparts.  
 
 
Estate agency, professionalisation and regulation in the UK 
 
As with the USA, the main driving force behind the initial regulatory attempts in the UK was 
the membership association, the Auctioneers’ and Estate Agents’ Institute. 43  This body 
developed via amalgamations of various real estate related associations in the period between 
the 1880s and 1912.
44
 The last of these amalgamations in 1912 between the Auctioneers 
Institute (AI) and the Estate Agents Institute (EAI) created the AEAI.
45
 The AEAI was a 
similar federated structure to NAREB, with local branches and a national council. In 1912 
12 
 
there were 12 branches, but over the course of the interwar period their number and 
membership grew steadily. 
 
Table 1  
 
A lack of suitable occupational data, means it is difficult to establish what percentage of 
practicing estate agents were AEAI members. The Institute estimated that it was around 
50%.
46
  A Fellowship was the main mode of membership, and could gained via examinations 
or, until a rule chance in 1920, by experience in the profession.
47
 The AEAI Council 
comprised of one representative from each branch, a president, various vice presidents, a 
secretary and several other officers. The council members would serve three year terms, 
whilst the presidency was for one year. However, re-election was possible, and it was 
common for council members and presidents to serve more than one term. In 1920 the 
method of composing the council changed to an elected membership of 30 and ex-officio 
membership was granted to all past presidents. The council met 10 times per year at the 
organisations’ London HQ in Russell Square, and after 1925, Lincoln’s Inn Fields.48 The 
exclusively male council, was populated by the type of middle class, socially aspirational 
men who had enjoyed significant success in the estate agency business.
49
  
 
The branches were headed by an elected chairman, and secretary. The branches conduct, and 
the content and frequency of their meetings, was left to their own discretion. There were 
several important annual get-togethers between the council and the branches: the AGM held 
in London, the yearly (and latterly twice yearly) conferences between the council and branch 
chairmen, and the Annual Provincial Meeting – the social event of the AEAI year hosted by 
one of the branches, and attended by the president and members of the committee. The local 
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boards, and AEAI in general, matched their NAREB cousins in terms of their appetite for 
socialising, with everything from golfing societies to tourist excursions, and regular dinners. 
The APMs were essentially week long social occasions consisting of an endless round of 
dinners, visits to local attractions, sporting events and congratulatory speeches.
50
 So, whilst 
relations between the council and boards were generally good with plenty of interaction 
between centre and periphery, the boards exercised a great deal independence, and many 
local members clearly saw their boards primarily in terms of providing opportunities for 
fraternal socialising.
51
 
 
The AEAIs objectives were based on those of its predecessors, the AI and EAI. As with the 
Realty boards, many objectives were focused on the prevention of the ruinous competition 
and litigation between agents. None of the stated objectives related to clients’ interests, and 
none could be considered as stemming directly from public interest concerns. Instead, like 
Realty boards, their central objectives were ‘to raise the status’ of estate agents52, ensure 
‘better definition and protection of the profession by a system of examinations’, provide 
opportunities for members to socialise,  and to ‘watch over, promote, and protect the mutual 
interests’ of members.53 There was little in the objectives beyond this commitment to ‘elevate 
the status and procure the advancement of the interests of the profession’54, and despite a 
good deal of later rhetoric in terms of public service and protecting public interests, these 
official objectives changed little over the interwar period.
55
 
 
However, as Wilensky notes, licensing is not an essential element of professionalization, and 
whereas NAREB began its professionalising project with occupational licensing as its 
ultimate and essential culmination, the AEAI, right from its inception, exhibited a rather 
equivocal attitude towards regulation. Although, one of the conditions of the creation of the 
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AEAI was that licensing of estate agents be sought by parliamentary legislation,
56
 the 
objectives of the Institute are more ambiguous. They stated that the Institute would seek to 
obtain ‘any Act of Parliament, Royal Charter, or other authority’57 to fulfil its aim of attaining 
professional status. A charter was a method of incorporation, granted by the Privy Council, 
and was seen as recognition of an organisations pre-eminence, stability and permanence - 
simply a royal seal of approval. Unlike parliamentary legislation it could not impose upon an 
occupation mandatory licensing or any other barriers to entry. So whilst an Act of Parliament 
and therefore state regulation was seen as an option, the AEAI would also countenance a 
Charter to achieve its goal of elevating the occupation to that of a profession. This ambiguity 
and lack of singular commitment to state backed regulation would shape the story of estate 
agent regulation from this point on. 
 
The first serious attempt at regulation of estate agents was the Auctioneers and Estate Agents 
Registration Bill of 1914, known as the Boyton bill. The AEAI asserted that regulation was 
sought for the benefit of its members and to improve the status of the occupation. Elements 
within the AEAI, clearly believed that in order to achieve this elevation in status, a small 
group of elite AEAI members needed to control entry into the occupation, and therefore 
define almost every aspect of the nascent profession. As one later proponent of the bill noted, 
to be effective, regulation needed a single controlling body invested ‘with the authority to 
enable it to control the selection, the training and the conduct of every practitioner’.58 The 
Boyton bill was very much in the regulatory capture mould. It would create a corporate body, 
the Auctioneers and Estate Agent’s Registration Board who would maintain, police and 
control entry to a register of estate agents. As this was regulation of function, the board would 
essentially be granting agents a licence to practice. The board would comprise of three 
members appointed by the Board of Trade, six members elected by the Surveyors Institution, 
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and six by the AEAI. Each body was allowed to choose its members as it saw fit. A 
committee quorum only required seven members, meaning that a meeting could be convened 
almost exclusively by AEAI members only. Neither the Board of Trade nor the Surveyors 
Institution were involved in the formulation or promotion of the bill, it was entirely driven by 
the AEAI. Registration could be denied if applicants had previously been refused 
membership of the AEAI, had been convicted, or been made bankrupt. Furthermore, although 
all existing members of the AEAI would automatically be entered onto the register, the board 
could reject new registrations, even if they had passed the AEAI membership examination if 
it felt that the examinations were not sufficiently robust. The board also had carte blanch in 
terms of the fees it set for registration, examinations, hearings and so forth. As registration 
had legal status, criminal convictions could result if the law was transgressed. Offenses such 
as acting as an agent without being registered, or falsifying membership documents, could 
result in anything from a £20 to £100 fine and 12 months’ imprisonment. The board could 
unilaterally remove someone from the register, thanks to a catchall clause that enabled them 
to strike off anyone for ‘any act or default discreditable to an auctioneer or estate agent’. 
Once removed, only the board, or a high court order could allow re-registration.
59
 However, 
from this early stage tension within the industry, and the AEAI itself over the desirability of 
regulation was manifest. Three main factors caused this tension: the issue of secondary 
occupations; the desire of many members for a royal charter rather than occupational 
licensing; and the lack of professional identity for estate agents.  
 
According to the Institute’s official record, the bill had been unanimously approved by the 
council and chairmen of the branches, which gave the council confidence that they had the 
support of the members of the Institute.
60
 However, the letters pages of the Estates Gazette – 
the best source for the voice of independent agents and ordinary AEAI members – indicate 
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that whilst there was some support for the bill, there was also considerable disquiet amongst 
many rank and file members. Interestingly one of the voices advocating the withdrawal of the 
bill, pointed out that no draft had been submitted for agreement to a general meeting of 
members. Many members, as well as non-members, opposed the bill, clearly uneasy with the 
idea of such power being invested in the hands of a small licencing board.
61
 The most 
worrying aspect of the bill from their perspective was the clause that prohibited registered 
agents performing any other ‘profession, business, or occupation other than that of an 
auctioneer or estate agent’.62 Given the relatively volatile nature of the estate agency industry, 
with sales commissions the main method of remuneration, and the property markets’ 
exposure to broader economic fluctuations, many estate agents engaged in secondary 
occupations. Complimentary industries, such as furniture retailing were popular.
63
 For many 
in the higher echelons of the AEAI these were “commercial” activities, and therefore not 
compatible with the profession of estate agency. Furthermore, allowing estate agency to be a 
“part-time” occupation threatened the occupational purity upon which claims to professional 
status rested. This issue of barring registered agents from secondary occupations was a key 
factor in the ongoing failure to regulate the industry.  
 
Numerous letters in the Gazette also illustrated that the official endorsement many members 
wanted was a royal charter. Previous attempts had been made to gain a charter, and amongst 
many members there existed a long standing desire to follow in the footsteps of the likes of 
architects and surveyors, and secure chartered status as a way of raising their professional 
standing.
64
 Furthermore, the royal seal of approval that chartered status would bestow, could 
help solve issues of information asymmetry for the public. This could all be achieved without 
raising significant barriers to entry and creating a bureaucratic burden. Indeed, for a number 
of letter writer’s, regulation was the ‘lesser benefit’ to the charter. Interestingly others 
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expressed a view that agitation for the bill would strengthen their position in terms of 
obtaining the charter, suggesting that some saw the pursuit of regulation simply as a means to 
achieving chartered status. There was also a fear amongst some branches that if the Boyton 
bill was made law it would jeopardise the AEAI’s chances of obtaining a charter.65   
 
Finally, the Institute had not articulated a broader vision of what the profession stood for, its 
values and identity - the bill itself offered a very prosaic description of an estate agent. For 
NAREB regulation was the culmination of their professionalization project. They had gone 
through a process of defining their profession and once achieved, regulation was sought to 
police its boundaries.  For estate agents whilst we can detect elements of a nascent Realtor 
style process of professionalization in 1914, it was far from a coherent project. As with 
Realtors, the AEAI attempted to standardise agents’ fees by introducing a scale of charges as 
early as 1894.
66
 But, unlike Realtors, this was not part of a concerted move to standardised 
rules of conduct and participation in real estate transaction – there was for example, no MLS, 
or standard lease and conveyancing forms.
67
 Tentative steps had been towards education and 
defining a field of practice. Some initiatives dated from the 1890s, such as the regular council 
sessional meetings which featured educational papers delivered by council members (est. 
1893)
68
, or the reference and lending library at the organisations’ HQ (est. 1891).69 Many 
local branches ran a speaker series to advance ‘professional knowledge’ on matters affecting 
the occupation.
70
 In 1914 the AEAI attempted its initial foray into higher education by 
sponsoring a short lived £80 studentship at Cambridge for students studying the BSc in Land 
Management.
71
 Yet these were ad hoc, quite esoteric developments – it is clear from branch 
reports that educational activities were very much secondary to the social side of branch 
membership
72
 - that did little to articulate a coherent, broader vision for the profession. As a 
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result, by 1914 no clear definition of an estate agent had been developed, and there existed no 
professional ideal for ordinary AEAI members and non-members to buy into. 
 
The bill made little progress in parliament. Although the outbreak of WWI was clearly a 
significant reason for this, existing accounts fail to fully acknowledge that the reasons behind 
its promotion - industry regulation being captured by the AEAI – led to active opposition to 
the bill from within the industry and the AEAI itself.
73
 Opponents were not convinced that 
licensing was part of a larger project to raise their status and protect their interests. Rather 
they saw it as an unwarranted and potentially dangerous barrier that could deprive them of 
their livelihoods. The council had exhorted branch members to lobby their local MPs for 
support,
74
 but given the antipathy towards it from some quarters, this grass roots pressure was 
likely to have been patchy at best. The Boyton bill had served to crystallise tensions within 
the industry over the desirability of regulation, and indeed, the whole notion of how the 
professionalization of estate agency would be achieved. 
 
 
An industry divided  
 
The immediate post war years saw considerable advances in the professional development of 
the occupation. The AEAI Journal, established in 1920,
75
 was a revamped version of the 
previous Yearbook. It was the official organ of the organisation and kept readers abreast of 
the latest developments and debates in the field.It included long and compressive features on 
everything from changes to relevant legislation, the impact of government economic policy, 
to the finer details of property conveyance. It resolved readers’ questions on issues (mostly 
legal) and was generally littered with technical information and advice. In 1918, the AEAI 
19 
 
established a BSc in Estate Management at the University of London, accompanied by a 
£50pa scholarship.
76
 Even more importantly, in 1918-19 the College of Estate Management 
(CEM) was created.
77
 Similar to the Realtor’s educational establishment, the Institute for 
Research in Land Economics, the aim of the college was to provide an educational 
establishment that placed the ‘future education of the profession on a permanent public 
footing’, for the ‘enhancement of the profession and of the status of the Institute and its 
Members.’78 In a further echo of the Realtors progressivist civic ideals, the AEAI council also 
urged agents to become more involved in local government, and more influential in shaping 
housing and planning policy.
79
   
 
The AEAI let the issue of regulation lie during the war years, but was determined to continue 
its pursuit after the conflict.
80
 This they duly did in 1920, with the idea of reviving the 
moribund Boyton bill,
81
 this time with the support and input of the Land Agents Society and 
RICS.
82
 The result was the Clarke bill of 1923. The advocates of the Clarke bill tapped into 
the rhetoric of public interest. The bill itself stated that the main objective of licensing was to 
‘protect the public against the unqualified and irregular practitioner’ - a stark contrast to the 
Boyton Bill, which gave no mention of public interest concerns.
83
 Yet, the protection of the 
public still did not feature in the official objectives of the institute in the early 1920s
84
 and the 
journals indicate that protecting the ‘profession’ against irregular practitioners was the real 
objective of the bill.
 85
 So, despite claims to public interest, the bill was fuelled by the same 
motivations as the Boyton bill – a desire by elements in the AEAI to capture the regulatory 
process and control entry into occupation, in order to raise the status of estate agency. The 
council repeatedly asserted that registration would see estate agency elevated to a par with the 
likes of dentists and legal profession.
86
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The draft bill was again passed to branch committees for their consideration, but, again, not 
to a broader general meeting.
87
 Despite some alterations to proposed composition of the 
registration board, the bill itself largely duplicated the Boyton bill in all important respects: 
reasons for refusing or removing registration; punishment; fees, and so forth.
88
 The council 
had clearly not heeded the concerns grass roots members held regarding the Boyton bill. As a 
result, the Clarke bill simply reinforced the pre-existing divisions within the industry and the 
organisation. The same fundamental issues that had undermined support for Boyton, 
remained: the prohibiting of secondary occupations, the desire for a charter, and the lack of 
professional identity. Many members felt that prohibiting secondary occupations would lead 
to honest hard working men being unfairly prevented from earning a living, and believed that 
the Institute should strive to embody everyone practicing as an estate agent whether that be in 
conjunction with another occupation or not.
89
 In particular, concern was raised for those 
starting out in the industry who often needed other revenue streams to support themselves as 
their agency business established itself.  One critic of the bill stated it was ‘saturated with 
medieval ideas as to the value of guilds’ and gave ‘considerable advantage to old-established 
firms who have a large business which they desire to protect against competition.’ 90  
Whether, as such criticism infers, this really was a case of older established firms seeking to 
defend their business against upstart competition is difficult to ascertain. Most council 
members certainly appeared to run relatively large, well established firms, particularly in 
London. However, criticism of the idea of prohibiting secondary occupations could come 
from just such members, including the likes of Sir Howard Frank, a council member, former 
President, and highly influential industry figure who ran large firms in London and 
Edinburgh.
91
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The internal resistance to licensing and the regulatory capture it entailed was again evidenced 
by the ongoing strong support in many sections of the organisation for a royal charter. During 
the early 1920s, the presidents and councils had to constantly exhort the AEAI membership 
to prioritise the securing of regulation above the acquisition of a charter, which they felt 
would be like a knighthood, ‘a dignity and nothing else.’92 Furthermore, there was increasing 
ideological resistance amongst estate agents to the idea of state intervention in the industry.
93
 
A Liverpool branch member proclaimed, it was ‘madness’ to follow the emerging school of 
thought that ‘everything could be done by the state on socialistic lines’. As with Realtors, 
many estate agents saw themselves as entrepreneurs, who wanted freedom from government 
interference, as it was only through private enterprise that the ‘great problems of the time 
could be solved.’ The CEM was cited as a great example of this private entrepreneurial spirit, 
whereas banning AEAI members from secondary occupations, was a form of trade 
unionism.
94
 The economic climate of the early 1920s was also not favourable to the 
introduction of new regulation. The bill was devised against a backdrop of post war austerity, 
the recession of 1920-21, relatively high unemployment, and housing shortages.
95
 The AEAI 
presidential addresses of 1921 and 1922 note the challenges facing estate agents in terms of 
these post war economic problems, rising taxes, and industrial unrest.
96
 
 
Finally, the AEAI had still not articulated a unifying identity for estate agents. The bill was 
again an attempt at regulating appellation, but the appellations it listed in order to cover all 
those engaged in aspects of estate agency business - Land Agent, Estate Agent, Surveyor, 
Quantity Surveyor, Valuer, House Agent, or Auctioneer – illustrated just how ill-defined the 
occupation was. Indeed, at the time of the Clarke bill the AEAI was belatedly becoming 
aware of the need to develop a single, universally recognised name for their profession. 
Members were conscious of the developments occurring with the Realtors and their progress 
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towards regulation and professional recognition. By the mid-1920s council members were 
visiting North America to report on the development of the profession there. In 1923 the first 
attempt at branding estate agency was made by a judge at the annual dinner of the Liverpool 
branch, who, pointing out the lack of definition in the current terminology, suggested the title 
of “Propter” to cover all those dealing with the conveyance of real estate.97 Similarly, in his 
1924 presidential address, Charles Osenton noted that their vocation suffered from a ‘plethora 
of ill-defined designations: “agents”; “surveyors”; “auctioneers”’, and stated his belief that it 
needed to adopt a one-word term. Osenton dismissed the term ‘Realtor’ as ‘hideously ugly’ 
but got straight to the crux of the matter by identifying that ‘it has two great virtues: it is 
short, and everyone in the States knows what it means.’98 Despite dislike amongst the council 
over the name Realtor they were acknowledging, albeit belatedly, that in order to define the 
profession, they needed a definition.  
 
Once submitted, and despite the optimism of the council, the Clarke bill garnered little 
parliamentary support. The bill also roused external opposition, from the likes of the National 
Farmers Union, the National Federation of Building Trades Employers and the Law Society, 
who seemed to fear the threat registration might pose to their own business interests in the 
property market.
99
 Despite the council engaging with the likes of the law society, and 
amending the bill to assuage this opposition, it failed to reach a second reading, and was 
doomed.
100
 Whilst external opposition was a factor in the failure of the bill, it is also the case 
that by again seeking regulatory capture, the AEAI council had alienated a large cohort of its 
own members. As the Times reported, ‘strenuous opposition’ was always likely given that the 
bill sought to ‘create a monopoly’ and vest the power over men’s livelihoods in the hands of 
a small registration board.
101
 One president later noted, support within the organisation and 
industry for the bill was by no means unanimous, indeed, he himself had been opposed.
102
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The bill signalled the end of the AEAI’s status as the single representative trade body for the 
industry, and was perhaps the last genuine opportunity for the licensing of estate agents for 
the next half a century. The opposition to the Clarke bill led directly to the creation in 1924 of 
the rival organisation, the Incorporated Society of Auctioneers and Landed Property Agents 
(ISALPA), and heralded a period of division within the industry.
103
 Small, localised trade 
bodies had been around since at least the early 1920s
104
, but none threatened the AEAIs 
national dominance. The ISALPA was different. Sadly, no records appear to survive for the 
ISALPA, but it was founded simply out of opposition to the AEAIs attempts to secure 
licensing that barred those engaged in secondary ‘commercial’ activities from practicing 
estate agency.
105
 The ISALPA membership consisted of estate agents who had additional 
‘legitimate interests in business’.106 
 
Relations between the two bodies were understandably poor. AEAI members were urged not 
to support or engage with the ISALPA,
107
 and relations seemed to reach something of nadir in 
1926 when the only objection to the AEAIs application to the Privy council for a royal 
charter, came from the ISALPA.
108
 The AEAI, bruised by its defeats, aware that further 
attempts at licensing would be controversial within the organisation, and almost certainly 
attract opposition from the ISALPA placed the idea of regulation into abeyance in 1925.
109
 It 
officially ceased the pursuit of regulation with its partners the Surveyors and LAS, in 1926.
110
 
Therefore, the final interwar bill introduced to Parliament by the industry itself, the Landed 
Property Agents’ Registration bill (the Harney bill), was a creation of ISALPA. As with the 
AEAI’s previous attempts, the Harney bill had little basis in public interest concerns. It was 
driven by a desire to ‘protect every person’ practicing as an estate agent or auctioneer and by 
by a slightly contorted version of regulatory capture – a desire on the part of ISAPLA to 
24 
 
direct the regulatory process to ensure it was not captured by a rival organisation, the 
AEAI.
111
  
 
In late February 1928, permission was sought in the Commons to introduce the Harney bill to 
the House for its first reading. The details are sketchy, but the bill was essentially similar to 
Boyton and Clarke in that it would require a registration board comprised of the main 
recognised bodies, including the ISALPA and AEAI. They would determine the nature of the 
qualification needed to be registered. The main differences were that secondary occupations 
were allowed, and that the act would initially be permissive so registration would only be 
compulsory after two years.
112
 When seeking to introduce the bill Lord Harney claimed that it 
had the unanimous support of ‘the house and estate agents themselves’. Yet, as the AEAI 
representative pointed out to the House, it clearly did not, as it did not have the support of the 
AEAI, RICS or the LAS. Despite there being ‘much in the bill’ that the three bodies could 
agree with, the fundamental issue of secondary occupations remained. Furthermore, whilst 
the ISAPLA had circulated a draft of the bill to the AEAI, it had done so only a few days 
before its submission to Parliament, leaving the AEAI little time to consider the proposals.
113
 
Without the support of the three other professional bodies the bill was destined to fail. 
 
Although relations improved between the AEAI and ISALPA, their entrenched views of 
secondary occupations, meant achieving licensing of estate agency throughout the 20s and 
30s remained almost impossible. Instead the development, by all four of the major bodies, of 
a code of conduct for members proved popular, with over 83% of AEAI members voting in 
its favour. The code was promoted by a publicity campaign of information cards and circulars 
that members could distribute to clients. Consideration also was given to the idea to register 
the name estate agent as a trade name, similar to that of the Realtor. These initiatives 
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demonstrated that, like the royal charter, most members wanted these types of soft, industry 
led solutions to the issue of raising the status of their occupation, rather than government 
backed regulation.
114
  
 
The ISALPA continued to agitate for licensing, occasionally unsuccessfully seeking 
discussions with the AEAI about the matter.
115
 However, by the 1930s, with the expansion in 
the housing markets, credit, and homeownership,
116
 the unregulated and generally anarchic 
state of the estate agency industry appeared to become a source of public amusement
117
, and 
was bringing the occupation into ‘bad repute’.118 As a result, the ISALPAs harassment of the 
government over licencing found receptive ears in the mid-30s. In 1935 the House of Lords 
established a commission on the subject of estate agency regulation to protect the public from 
rogue practitioners.
119
 After taking evidence from the main societies the Mersey Commission, 
as it was known, recommended licensing, but entirely controlled by the state. Licenses would 
be granted by Customs and Excise, after the applicant had gained a certificate of fitness from 
a Petty Sessional Court - none of the main bodies would have any control over the regulatory 
process.
120
 Such a system was clearly not attractive to the main bodies, but they were 
attentive to the possibility of achieving regulatory capture by shaping legislation to their 
advantage. The AEAI was still sceptical but nevertheless engaged in tentative discussions 
with the other organisations on a potential bill.
121
 However, before substantive progress could 
be made the MP Sir Reginald Clarry submitted a bill to the commons to give effect to the 
Mersey recommendations.
122
 Clarry bill mirrored the Mersey Commission recommendations 
almost exactly, and, as he had not consulted with nor gained the support of the four main 
bodies they naturally opposed the bill, and the fate of the final interwar attempt at licensing of 
estate agents was sealed.
123
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Conclusion 
 
The interwar years were a seminal period in the development of the modern British property 
market, and in the emergence of one of its key service industries: estate agency. This article 
has demonstrated how the emergence of the industry was accompanied by attempts to 
regulate practitioners via licensing. However, unlike other contemporary industries, these 
attempts were not triggered by public interest factors, but were instigated by the trade 
association of estate agents, the AEAI, as part of their wider efforts to raise estate agency to 
the status of a profession. In many respects this mirrored the process that was occurring in the 
USA with NAREB. Both organisations believed that capturing the regulatory process as part 
of their professionalization projects would serve the public interest, by removing undesirable 
practitioners from the market. However, the pursuit of regulation caused tensions within their 
organisations, and the broader industry. NAREB was able to overcome these tensions via 
compromise, the creation of the Realtor identity, and control of the MLS. Conversely, the 
AEAI seemed inflexible, unwilling to compromise on the issue of secondary occupations, and 
unable to articulate a collective identity for estate agents. These tensions ultimately 
determined the form licensing took in the case of the US, and why regulatory attempts failed 
in the UK.  As a result of this failure, barriers to entry into estate agency remained low, and 
the industry was able to engage in the type of “entrepreneurial” practices that did much to 
fuel the 20
th
 century British property market. Indeed, the emergence of various trade 
associations that occurred in the 1920s had important long term implications for the structure 
of the industry. The continuing proliferation of trade associations after WWII meant that by 
the mid-1960s the number of representative bodies had risen to 10 in England alone.
124
 Given 
such fragmentation, consensus on regulation continued to prove impossible throughout the 
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20
th
 century. Mandatory licensing of estate agents remained (and remains) elusive, and the 
low barriers to entry led to an industry populated primarily by small, localised independent 
firms.
125
 Finally, on a broader level, this article demonstrates that we must appreciate how 
complex internal industry dynamics can interact with ideas of regulatory capture and public 
interest, in order to fully understand what fuels, shapes, and determines the success of 
attempts at regulation.  
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